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UNNATURAL SELECTION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
THE IMPACT OF STANDARDIZED TEST USE
ON HIGHER EDUCATION RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

By the time we reach adulthood, most of us have taken numerous
standardized objective tests.1 In fact, we spend a great deal of time and
nervous energy anticipating performance results which we know will significantly affect our academic and professional careers. Nevertheless, we
tend to accept the examination process as an inevitability even though we
may question whether it is appropriate for standardized test results to
control our academic opportunities.
The principal appeal of standardized exams is their purported objectivity and absence of bias.2 It is no doubt useful for educators to have
one objective criterion, uniform for all students, which "allow[s] students
regardless of race, religion or sex to 'run the same race.' "" However,
rather than serving as "objective" instruments, standardized tests often
produce inaccurate and inconsistent results and render noticeable score
differentials based on the race, gender, and socioeconomic status of the
test-taker.4 The fact that female, minority, and low-income examinees
systematically receive lower objective test scores than upper-income,
white, and male examinees do,5 raises the question of whether the exams
are objective at all. In addition, the gender and race differentials should
encourage us to temper the influence of standardized exam results on the
distribution of educational and economic opportunities in this country.
1. See Medina & Neill, Falloutfrom the Testing Explosion: How 100 Million Standardized Exams Undermine Equity and Excellence in America's Public Schools, NAT'L CENTER
FOR FAIR & OPEN TESTING (FAIRTEsT), Oct. 1988, at 5 (copies available from FairTest,
Cambridge, Mass.). In 1986-87, between 94 and 105 million test batteries were administered
to 39.8 million public school students. Id. In addition, every year 2.5 million students take
college entrance exams. Rosser, The SAT Gender Gap: Identifying the Causes, CENTER FOR
WOMEN POL'Y STUD. 3 (1989) [hereinafter SAT Gender Gap] (copies available from the
Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.).
2. Shapiro, Slutsky & Watt, Minimizing Unnecessary RacialDifferences in Occupational
Testing, 23 VAL. U.L. REv. 213, 215 (1989).
3. A. NAIRN & ASSOC., THE REIGN OF ETS: THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP

MINDS 197 (1980) (remarks of former ETS director, Robert Moulthrop). This is the Ralph
Nader Report on the Educational Testing Service.
4. Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 3.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27-58.
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The purpose of this Comment is to assess whether the legal system is
equipped to address the problematic aspects of standardized testing,
either through litigation or legislation. This Comment evaluates how existing legal doctrine might be applied to challenge the use of standardized
testing in higher education and examines whether it is legally defensible
for educational institutions to predicate admission and scholarship distribution on tests which contain admitted culture and gender biases. In
view of the difficulties involved in litigating test-use claims under available legal theories, this Comment proposes a possible legislative remedy
and evaluates the viability of that remedy.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. Overview of the Uses and Effects of Standardized Testing
The 40 million public school students in this country take over 100
million standardized tests each year to determine proficiency and class
placement.6 Schools traditionally use such exams to assess student
achievement and to diagnose students' academic strengths and weaknesses.7 More recently, many schools have begun to use standardized

test results as the primary criterion for student assignment to remedial
education programs or to "gifted and talented" programs.'
When students reach the tenth or eleventh grades, approximately
1.1 million of them will take the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test
(PSAT).9 The PSAT is billed as a practice run for the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the test most commonly used by colleges in making
admissions decisions.10 However, the PSAT score also serves as the sole
criterion for distribution of more than 23 million dollars of National
Merit Scholarship money for students who go on to college. 1
Most students who plan to attend college will take the SAT. 12 Some
schools use the SAT score alone to determine which applicants to ad6. Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting statistics for the 1986-87 school year).
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id.
9. Rosser, Sex Bias in College Admissions Tests: Why Women Lose Out, NAT'L CENTER
FOR FAIR & OPEN TESTING (FARTEsT), Aug. 1988, at 3 (copies available from FairTest,
Cambridge, Mass.).

10. SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 22.
11. Id.
12. There are several different types of standardized college entrance exams in addition to

the SAT. The discussion in this Comment will focus on the SAT because the SAT is the exam
most widely administered to college-bound students. Rosser, supra note 9, at 2. In addition,
more information is available on the SAT, because it has been studied more frequently than
other college entrance exams.
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mit,1 3 and some combine the score with high school grades and class
rank. 14 Although colleges weigh the SAT score differently in their ad-

missions processes, there is no doubt that a student's admission to college
can be strongly affected by that student's SAT score. 5
/
Students who go on to graduate or professional schools must confront another battery of tests: the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) for
graduate school; the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) for law school;
the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) for business school;
and, the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) for medical school, to
16
name a few.
In addition to this array of educational testing, many employers
now use standardized exams as part of hiring or promotion procedures. 17
However, in contrast to educational testing, both employment testing
and its impact on employment decisions are monitored and regulated by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196418 and the relevant regulations
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
19

(EEOC).

The short- and long-term effects that test results have on a test-

taker's life reveal the importance of standardized testing in contemporary
American society. In the employment testing context, standardized ex-

ams can account for an outright denial of employment opportunities.20
At the elementary school level, where standardized test results determine
the tracking of students into "ability groups,"2 1 students in the lower
13. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT 127 (1988).
14. Id.
15. Currently, only Bowdoin College has abandoned use of the SAT score for admission,
and three others colleges-Bates, Union and Middlebury-provide students with other testing
options in lieu of the SAT. See Allina, Beyond Standardized Tests: Admissions Alternatives
That Work, NAT'L CENTER FOR FAIR & OPEN TESTING (FAIRTEST), Nov. 1987, at 3 (copies

available from FairTest, Cambridge, Mass.).
16. Id. at 2-3.
17. See Shapiro, Slutsky & Watt, supra note 2, at 215.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). Section (h) states in part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice... for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id.
19. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.15
(1988).
20. See, e.g., Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 323, 408 N.E.2d 310
(1980) (insurance broker licensing exams); Martin v. Educational Testing Serv., 179 N.J.
Super. 317, 431 A.2d 868 (1981) (real estate licensing exam).
21. See Fiske, Lessons: More and more educators agree that grouping students by ability is
misguided, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1990, at B7, col. 1; see also Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 2022 for discussion of how standardized testing is used in student tracking.
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tracks can suffer low self-esteem and low expectations that become selffulfilling prophecies which inhibit their success later in life.2 2
College admission tests may diminish a student's chances to attend a
competitive college and may also result in less opportunity for scholarship money.2 3 Attending a less competitive college can affect students
later in life as they receive lower-level jobs and have fewer leadership
opportunities.2 4 Specifically, if college test results cause a student to attend a two-year junior college instead of a four-year college, that student's long-term career opportunities may be significantly restricted.25
Graduates of vocational junior colleges often are unable to find work in
the occupations for which they are trained and may be more likely to
suffer from unemployment than those who hold bachelor's degrees.2 6
B.

Score Differentials Across Gender and Culture Groups

1. The debate about the value and meaning of test results
Officials of the Educational Testing Service (ETS) have defended objective testing in higher education as one means of transforming our society from an aristocracy to a meritocracy where social stratification and
economic opportunities will be distributed according to achievement or
merit rather than birthright.2 7 Unfortunately, the use of standardized
testing has had the effect of confirming-and even compounding-the
social stratification it was designed to ameliorate because standardized
test results tend to correlate more with gender, race and economic status
than they do with the test-taker's achievement, ability or skill.2"
No one, not even those who write and administer the tests, disputes
the fact that score differentials exist.2 9 Dispute instead centers around
the causes of the gaps and the question of who must assume responsibil22. Fiske, supra note 21, at col. 2; see also Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 20-22; Leslie &
Wingert, Not as Easy as A, B or C, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1990, at 56-57.
23. Rosser, supra note 9, at 17.
24. Id.
25. See S. BRINT & J. IARABEL, THE DIVERTED DREAM: COMMUNITY COLLEGES AND
THE PROMISE OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA, 1900-1985 122-23 (1989).

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 197-98.
See Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 21.
The College Board's annual report expressly states that women receive lower mean

SAT scores than men. COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, COLLEGE BOUND
SENIORS: 1988 PROFILE OF SAT AND ACHIEVEMENT TEST TAKERS iii-iv (1988) [hereinafter
COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT]. The same report presents tables of SAT scores by racial and
ethnic group. The tables clearly indicate that white students receive higher overall scores than
students who are members of racial and ethnic minorities. Id. at v.
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ity for correcting the score differentials.3 ° Many researchers have argued
that the gender, race, and economic biases revealed in test results are
biases inherent in the style of the tests themselves.3 1 Objective exams
require examinees to make discrete answer choices. However, when
question contexts have different plausible meanings for individuals from

different cultural backgrounds, the credited response will necessarily reflect the cultural perspective of the test-writer who can only belong to
one gender, race, and socioeconomic group and is likely to be white, male
and middle or upper-middle class.3 2
ETS officials have countered that the differentials in test results

across culture groups are a product of the unequal educational opportun30. The College Board attributes the gender differentials to the fact that women SAT takers tend to come from lower-income households, are more likely to be bilingual, and tend to be
in the first generation of their family to attend college. Id. at iv. According to the Board, all of
these characteristics are associated with lower than average SAT scores. Id.
Other researchers claim that the gender differentials result from the nature and format of
the test and from bias in individual test items. See Rosser, supra note 9, at 16.
See also Hoover, The Politicsof Education: Illiteracy and Test Bias, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
64, 68-71 (1987) for discussion of issues in black education, including issues of competency
testing in public schools.
31. See, e.g., Wilder & Powell, Sex Differences in Test Performance: A Survey of the Literature, COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD 25-28 (also referred to as College Board
Report No. 89-3 or ETS RR No. 89-4) (1989) (copies available from The College Board, New
York, N.Y.) (discussion of gender bias in individual test items); see also Medina & Neill, supra
note 1, at 7-12 (discussion of race and gender biases in individual test items and of bias inherent in structure of standardized tests).
32. Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 8. For example, black students often associate the
word "environment" with terms such as "home" or "people." Id. White students tend to
associate "environment" with "air," "clean" or "earth." Id. Neither usage is wrong. But the
"correct" answer on a standardized test question incorporating the concept of "environment"
can only reflect one of these cultural perspectives.
Two SAT items which produced score differences based on ethnicity or gender are the
following:
(**indicates the credited response)
DIVIDENDS: STOCKHOLDERS::
(A) investments: corporations
(B)
purchases: customers
(C) royalties: authors **
(D) taxes: workers
(E) mortgages: homeowners
This question, on its face, favored wealthier students. It favored boys over girls
by 15%. Rosser, supra note 9, at app. I.
RUNNER: MARATHON::
(A) envoy: embassy
(B) martyr: massacre
(C) oarsman: regatta **
(D) referee: tournament
(E) mortgages: homeowners
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ties in this country.3 3 They argue that standardized tests can play a positive role in solving this problem by focusing public attention on unequal

opportunities and inducing public pressure to correct these inequities. 34
However, until score differentials are completely eliminated from stan-

dardized exams, we must address the issue of how and to what extent
these exam results will be used in the allocation of educational and eco-

nomic resources.
2.

The gender gap

SAT scores for men and women have seldom been equivalent since
the SAT was first administered in 1926. 35 Since 1972, women have
scored an average of 10-11 points lower than men on the verbal section of
the SAT and 40-50 points lower on the math section.3 6 In spite of these
score differentials, women tend to earn higher average grades than men
in both high school and college. 37 Authors have suggested that women
achieve higher grades because they tend to concentrate their studies in
the humanities where higher average grades are the norm. 38 However,

independent studies undertaken at several universities have found that
women's performance equals, and sometimes exceeds, men's performance in math and science as well as humanities subjects,3 9 and that parity
53% of whites answered this item correctly compared with 22% of blacks. Id.
33. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 9 (citing EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, TEST SCORES AND FAMILY INCOME: A RESPONSE TO CHARGES IN THE NADER/

NAIRN REPORT ON ETS (1980)).
34. Id. (citing EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, TRUSTEES' 1984 PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (1984)).

35. Wilder & Powell, supra note 31, at v.
36. Id; see also Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 365 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (appendix in opinion lists mean SAT scores for college-bound seniors). Before 1972,
women earned slightly higher average verbal scores than men (2-3 points) and men earned
math scores 40-50 points higher. Id. The 1989 statistics reported by the College Board reveal
no change in the gender gap-women averaged a combined score of 875, compared with 934
for men. See Carmody, Minority Students Gain on College Entrance Tests, N.Y. Times, Sept.
12, 1989, at A16, col. 4.
37. Wilder & Powell, supra note 31, at vi.
38. Id.; see also Goldberg, Numbers Don't Lie: Men Do Better Than Women, N.Y. Times,
July 5, 1989, at A21, col. 1 (sociologist argues that men earn lower college grades because they
take more difficult courses than women do).
39. See, eg., E.A. Kanarek, Gender Differences in Freshman Performance and Their Relationship to Use of the SAT in Admissions (unpublished report) (Rutgers University internal
study reports that although women entered 1985-86 first-year class with combined SAT score
of 50 points lower than men's, GPA differences in favor of women were observable by end of
first year in math/science as well as humanities courses); MIT Committee on Undergraduate
Admissions and Financial Aid, Final Report 9-10 (May 1989) (unpublished report) (faculty
committee at university offering predominantly science and technical courses reports that women admitted to MIT have lower average standardized math and science test scores than men
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in men's and women's grade point averages is not the result of differences

in course selection. 4'
Comparing test scores with ultimate college performance reveals

that the problem of bias in standardized exams is particularly acute
where women are concerned. Here, the net effect of reliance on test
scores is that those students who ultimately perform average or above in
college-women-may be disproportionately excluded from educational
opportunities and scholarship receipt.4 1 This adverse effect is especially

likely to occur if colleges use test scores without adjusting for the fact
that women with lower test scores will perform more successfully than
their test scores indicate.4 2
3.

Race and culture gap

The aspect of standardized testing which has received the most public attention is the purported racial and ethnic bias in the SAT and similar aptitude tests.4 3 In elementary and secondary schools, standardized
test use tends to cluster white and upper-middle class students in advanced classes, and relegate minority and lower-income students to midlevel and remedial classes.' This occurs even in school districts where
enrolled students are predominantly racial and ethnic minorities.45
College-bound white and non-white students have dramatically different SAT scores, a difference which favors white students.4 6 Statistics
reported by the College Board in 1988 indicate that whites received the
highest combined SAT score at 935, followed by Asians (930) (5 point
gap), Native Americans (828) (107 point gap), Latin Americans (820)
but ultimately achieve GPAs statistically indistinguishable from men's); see also, Jaffe &
Wrightman, No Deficit on Campus, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1989, at A28, col. 6. Jaffe and
Wrightman are the respective chairmen of the departments of mathematics at Harvard and
Princeton; they report that they have not seen any evidence on their campuses indicating that
women are deficient in mathematical ability. Id.
40. See SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 92-93. Comparative GPA studies which also
control for course selection eliminate the possibility that higher GPAs result from a combination of courses composed primarily of courses in which the average grade in that course is
higher than the average intra-course grades at the university in question.
41. See id. at 22-23.
42. Id. at 91-92 (discussion of how one admission formula used for men and women alike
adversely affects women).
43. See, e.g., Kroll, Manley, Springen, Pedersen, Wingert & Brailsford, Race Becomes the
Game, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 56, 58, col. 1; Vaughan, SATs harm: (A) women & (B)
minorities?, The Daily News, Nov. 29, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Vobejda, A Debate Revived: Do
College Board Tests Measure Potential?,Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
44. Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 21.
45. Id.
46. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 90.
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(115 point gap), Mexican Americans (810) (125 point gap), Puerto Ricans (757) (178 point gap), and Blacks (737) (198 point gap).47
Since students with low test scores tend to have low college admission rates, many colleges have instituted affirmative action programs in
an effort to remedy the effects that test bias has had on minority student
admissions.4 " Even so, a search for minority students across college campuses reveals that a disproportionate number of them are in fact concentrated in the least selective colleges.4 9 Because the university a student
attends can have a significant effect on that student's future graduate
school and professional opportunities,5" the long-term effect of a racially
lopsided enrollment pattern is that minority students will occupy fewer
professional and managerial positions as wage-earning adults. 1
Requiring minority students to have SAT scores equal to whites students' scores in order to be admitted to college will dramatically affect
minority student college enrollment. For example, in 1984, 10.5% of the
college-bound students who took the SAT were black.5 2 However, the
number of black students who could qualify for college admission with
SAT scores equal to those of whites does not reach 10.5% until score
levels drop to 350 (out of 800) on each section of the test. 3 If colleges
require black applicants to have SAT scores equal to whites' SAT scores
in order to be admitted, black students will be crowded into the least
selective colleges and underrepresented as a percentage
of the total col54
lege-bound population in the more selective schools.
It may be the case, as ETS has argued,5 5 that the racial biases in
standardized exams merely reflect the educational and economic inequities in our society.56 However, the fact is that unregulated use of exam
results is hindering the educational progress of minority students at all
levels of the educational spectrum, especially at the elementary school
level.57 This pattern suggests that standardized exams in fact compound
47. COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT, supra note 29, at v.
48. See J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 90 (noting that many colleges discount or ignore SAT scores of black applicants).
49. See infra Appendices A, C and D.
50. See S. BRINTr & J. KARABEL, supra note 25, at 130-31, 250 n.33 (discussion of correlation between education level and economic opportunity).
51. Id.
52. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 93.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See D. OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE: BEHIND THE MYTH OF SCHOLAsTIc AvriTUDE 224-25 (1985).
56. Id.
57. See Medina & Neill, supra note 1, at 18-23 for discussion of the impact of test use in
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the inequities that ETS claimed the exams would help alleviate.5 8
C. The Legal Problem
In view of the immediate and far-reaching effects of standardized
testing, 59 it is likely that gender and race differentials in test results are
contributing to disproportionate exclusion of women and minorities from
access to educational and economic opportunities. This disproportionate
exclusion raises an inference of discrimination which is actionable in
noneducational contexts.60 The question examined here is whether the
discriminatory effects of testing are actionable in the context of higher
education. That is, can students who feel they have been deprived of
admission or scholarship opportunities on account of test use sue university and scholarship distributors who have based their decisions on exam
results?
Parties injured by test use may litigate their grievances, but under
current legal doctrine, they are likely to achieve limited relief and mixed
results.6 1 The following section discusses the limited attention that edu-

cational testing has received from the legal system. Next an analysis of
the federal and statutory claims related to testing issues reveals that a

plaintiff's success on the merits is not guaranteed62 and in fact may be
elementary and secondary public schools. See also infra Appendices A, C, and D for statistics
on women and minority student enrollment patterns in selective and non-selective colleges.
58. Critics of the SAT have also charged that a ranking of students by SAT scores for the
most part mirrors a ranking of students by family income. See A. NAiRN & Assoc., supra
note 3, at 199. 1988 statistics released by the College Board reveal the following pattern with
respect to family income:
Family Income per Annum
over $70,000
$60,000-$70,000
$50,000-$60,000
$40,000-$50,000
$30,000-$40,000
$20,000-$30,000
$10,000-$20,000
under $10,000

Average Combined SAT Score
992
961
946
928
902
876
833
781

COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT, supra note 29, at 7. As one might expect, researchers have
found that the use of SAT scores reduces selective colleges' acceptances of low-income applicants. See J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 122.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26 for discussion of long-term effects of testing.
60. See, eg., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also
infra text accompanying notes 74-84 for discussion of employment testing and consequences of
discriminatory test use in employment.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 87-244 for analysis of statutory and constitutional
causes of action which apply to testing claims.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 124-209 for discussion of the difficulties of proving
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precluded at the outset by procedural difficulties. 63 The difficulty of liti-

gating testing claims" suggests that the problematic aspects of test use
may be most effectively addressed through legislation.6 5
III.

BACKGROUND:

A.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S INVOLVEMENT
IN TESTING

Elementary and Secondary School Testing

Congressional and judicial attention to testing issues was virtually
nonexistent before the early 1960s. Since then, however, elementary and
secondary school students have made statutory and constitutional chal-

lenges to standardized test use, alleging that test use contributed to denial
of educational opportunities to minority and economically disadvantaged
children. 66 Plaintiffs have specifically challenged test use which contributed to wrongful placement of minority students into classes for the Educable Mentally Retarded (EMR),67 placement of a disproportionate

number of minority students in the lowest class levels of a school district
tracking system,68 and denial of placement of minority students in classes
for Talented and Gifted (TAG) students.69
B.

Higher Education

In contrast to elementary school testing, standardized test use in
higher education has received minimal attention from the legal commu-

nity. Plaintiffs have sued ETS challenging score cancellation 70 and state
Bar examiners, challenging denial of admission to the Bar based on Mul-

tistate Exam results. 71 These challenges have largely proved unsuccess-

statutory violations, and text accompanying notes 221-44 for discussion of the difficulties of
proving constitutional violations.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 93-123 for discussion of statutory coverage and
private rights of action.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 245-53 for a summary of the problematic aspects of
litigation.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 254-59 for discussion of a proposed legislative
remedy.
66. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 574 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d
983 (4th Cir. 1985); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 793 F.2d 969
(9th Cir. 1984); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968).
67. Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 931.
68. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 406-07.
69. Vaughns, 574 F. Supp. at 1295.
70. Johnson v. Educational Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1029 (1985).
71. See, e.g., Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940
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ful. However, in the February 1989 case of Sharif v. New York State
EducationDepartment,7 2 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York enjoined the use of SAT scores as the sole basis for distributing college scholarships after finding that doing so precluded women students from receiving their fair share of scholarship money.73
C. Employment Testing
It is worth noting that employment testing, in contrast to educational testing, is heavily regulated by statute. During consideration of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 74 Congress debated the
proper uses of testing in employment. 75 The result of the debates is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(h) which restricts test use to professionally
developed ability tests not designed, intended, or used to discriminate.7 6
In a series of cases beginning in the early 1970s, the United States
Supreme Court developed standards for determining employer compliance with the statute and its corresponding regulations.7 7 In the 1971
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,78 the Court formulated a disparate
impact analysis whereby plaintiffs could make a prima facie showing of
discrimination merely by proving that using a particular test had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on minority group members.7 9
Griggs remained the hallmark decision for disparate impact claims for
80
eighteen years until the decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.
In Wards Cove, the Court stiffened plaintiffs' prima facie burden for raising an inference of discrimination8 1 and simultaneously relaxed the burden of proof for defendants who must establish the business necessity of
(1976); Powell v. Nigro, 601 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1985); Delgado v. MeTighe, 522 F. Supp.
886 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
72. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
73. Id. at 364. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Recent Cases: Civil RightsDisparate-ImpactDoctrine-CourtProhibitsAwarding Scholarshipson the Basis of Standardized Tests That DiscriminatorilyImpact Women, 103 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1990).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
75. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 197
(1988) (citing 110 CONG. REc. 5662, 13,492, 13,504 (1964)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) subsequently promulgated guidelines on testing procedures to clarify the statutory
provisions. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1989).
77. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
79. Id. at 431-32.
80. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
81. Id. at 2121-22, 2124-25.
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the challenged practice in order to prevail in the suit. 2 However, since
83
Wards Cove involved a challenge to a subjective employment practice,
its effect on challenges to objective employment practices, such as em84
ployment testing, is unclear.
When confronted with educational testing cases, courts frequently
reach for Title VII case law standards to assist them in evaluating the
legality of the challenged test use.8 s At least one judge has expressed
discomfort with applying employment discrimination standards to educational testing claims.8 6 However, the lack of distinct authority pertaining to educational test use may ensure that employment testing case law
will remain relevant to the adjudication of educational testing cases.

IV.

ANALYSIS: CHALLENGING TEST USE IN ADMISSIONS AND
SCHOLARSHIP DECISIONS

A. Introduction: Possible Causes of Action

Private litigants who wish to challenge test use in university adniission and scholarship decisions may bring both state and federal statutory

and constitutional claims.8 7 The federal law claims most applicable to
testing issues are Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,88 Title IX of
82. Id. at 2125-26.
83. Id. at 2120 (challenged hiring and promotion practices included "nepotism, a rehire
preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, [and] a practice of not
promoting from within .... ") (emphasis added).
84. Authors have expressed concern that Wards Cove may have a far-reaching effect on
future disparate impact claims. See, eg., Note, The Death of Comparable Worth: A Critical
Analysis of the United States Supreme Court'sDecision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
23 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1483 (1990). However, Wards Cove ultimately might not have a drastic
effect on future disparate impact claims involving challenges to testing. First of all, the decision may be overruled by legislation. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See also
Holmes, Bill Would Overturn Court's Rights Decisions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1990 (national
edition), at A20, col. 4. Second, the standards for establishing prima facie discrimination in an
employment testing case are specifically delineated in the Federal Regulations. See Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.41) (1989). The regulations
should control the prima facie determination in testing cases.
85. See, e.g., Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (Title VII case law standards applied where plaintiffs alleged gender discrimination in
educational test use); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 969-74 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 793
F.2d 969, 982-83 (9th Cir. 198.4) (district court and court of appeals both applied Title VII
standards to claim of race discrimination where discrimination allegedly resulted from test
use). See infra text accompanying notes 143-54 for a discussion of Sharif, and infra text accompanying notes 135-42 for a discussion of Larry P.
86. See Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 969.
87. The discussion in this Comment focuses on federal statutory and constitutional claims.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
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the Education Amendments of 1972,89 and the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment.9 0 In addition, plaintiffs may bring statelaw claims under state civil rights statutes9 1 or the equal protection pro92
visions of applicable state constitutions.
B.

The Statutory Claims: Title VI and Title IX
1. Establishing statutory coverage

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the

grounds of race, color or national origin in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 93 Similarly, Title IX of the Education Amendments prohibits gender discrimination in all federally assisted
education programs. 94 Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, 9' and
courts strive to construe the statutes so that they will coincide in scope
and effect. 96 Title IX expressly applies to public university admission
programs.9 7 Title VI applies to public universities as well since all public
schools receive federal money from the Department of Education.9 8
Both statutes also apply to private universities receiving federal funds. 99
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. See, eg., CoNN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-75 (West 1986) (statute requires that state
funded educational programs be open to all persons regardless of race, color, gender or national origin); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2511 (1987) (statute provides that all persons shall have
equal opportunity to participate in all aspects of life, including educational institutions); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20-148 (1987) (statute establishes civil liability against private parties for deprivation of any and all rights guaranteed under state and federal constitutions).
92. See, ag., GA. CONsT. art. I, § I; MASS. CONST. part I, art. I; PA. CONST. art. I., § 1.
See also infra notes 210-11 for a brief discussion of state constitutional claims.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). The statute states: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). The statute states: "No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
95. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984).
96. See, e.g., id. at 566-70 (citing congressional record on Title VI to determine whether
private college students' receipt of federal financial aid funds triggers Title IX coverage); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 683-85 (1979) (citing Title VI decisions to determine whether private right of action exists under Title IX); Sharif v. New York State Educ.
Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Title VI standards to determine
whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent to prevail in Title IX action).
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1988).
98. See 34 C.F.R. § 100 app. B (1988).
99. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 558 (1984) (Title IX coverage); Bob Jones Univ. v.
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (Title VI
coverage).
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To prevail in Title VI or Title IX actions, plaintiffs must first estab-

lish that the university practice at issue is subject to the statutory proscriptions."c
Establishing coverage requires proof of two threshold
issues: (1) that the university is a "recipient" of federal assistance when

it receives federal money only "indirectly" through federal scholarships
and grants paid to students who in turn pay tuition to the university;1'

1

and, (2) that federal assistance to a single university program may
trigger
02

statutory coverage of other university programs and activities.'

The Supreme Court answered the recipiency question with respect
to Title IX in Grove City College v. Bell.10 3 Grove City College received
no direct financial assistance but enrolled students who received federal
tuition grants."° The Court held that Title IX coverage was not foreclosed merely because federal funds were granted to Grove City's students rather than directly to one of the college's educational programs.' 0 5
Title VI coverage is also triggered where a private university receives indirect federal aid in the form of student education grants. 10 6 In

addition, a university enrolling students with federal tuition grants is a
"recipient" of federal assistance within the meaning of Title VI, even if
07
the university consistently refuses direct government aid.1
In order to clarify the scope of statutory coverage afforded by fed-

eral grants to one college program, Congress amended both Title IX' °8
and Title VI

°9

as part of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.110

100. See, eg., Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 558-59 (Title IX coverage); Bob Jones Univ.,
396 F. Supp. at 602 (Title VI coverage).
101. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 569-70; Bob Jones Univ., 396 F. Supp. at 601-02.
102. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 563-74; Bob Jones Univ., 396 F. Supp. at 601-04.
103. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
104. Id. at 558-59.
105. Id. at 569-70.
106. The lead case in this area is Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C.
1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d. 514 (4th Cir. 1975). Bob Jones is a fundamentalist university which
denies admission to unmarried non-whites and requires expulsion of all students who date
members of a race different from their own. Id. at 600.
107. Id.
108. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (West Supp. 1989)).
109. Id. § 6, 102 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-4a (West Supp.
1989)).
110. The Grove City College decision also discussed the extent of statutory coverage afforded by government contribution to a single university program. 465 U.S. at 571-76. According to the Court, only the "program or activity" receiving federal assistance could be
regulated under Title IX. Id. at 574. In response to that decision, Congress amended both
Title VI and Title IX. Section 2 of Public Law 100-259 states:
The Congress finds that(1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have
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The statutes as amended expand the definition of "program or activity"
to include "all of the operations of" a college or university.11 1 Now,

plaintiffs who wish to bring Title VI or Title IX claims against university
admissions or scholarship distribution practices may do so as long as the

university receives federal funds in any of its programs, regardless of
whether or not it receives funds specifically for its admissions or financial
1 12
aid programs.
2.

Private rights of action

A university covered by Title VI and Title IX incurs a statutory
duty to distribute its resources and administer its programs in a nondiscriminatory manner. However, private parties who believe that a uni-

versity has breached that duty may not sue for damages without an es1 13
tablished private right of action to do so.
Neither Title VI nor Title IX expressly authorizes private suits for
enforcement.

However, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,1

4

the

Supreme Court inferred a private right of action to enforce Title IX. 115
Four years after Cannon, the Court addressed the issue of whether
unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ... and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
(2) legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of those
laws as previously administered.
Pub. L. 100-259 § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
111. The amendments state: "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'program or activity'
and the term 'program' mean all of the operations of... (2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher
education; .. ." See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102
Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (West Supp. 1989)); id. § 6, 102
Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-4a (West Supp. 1989)).
112. It is worth noting that prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, the Title VI regulationsrequired all universities applying for federal assistance for any
purpose to guarantee that their admission practices were in compliance with Title VI race
discrimination prohibitions. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(1) (1988). The regulations state:
(d) Assurancesfrom institutions. (1) In the case of any application for Federal
financial assistance to an institution of higher education (including assistance for construction, for research, for [a] special training project, for student loans, or for any
other purpose), the assurance required by this section shall extend to admission practices and to all other practices relating to the treatment of students.
45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(1) (1988).
113. See E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 315-22 (1989).
114. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
115. Id. at 693-94. The Court in Cannon noted that at the time Title IX was enacted, lower
federal courts had interpreted Title VI as creating a private remedy. Id. at 694-98 (citations
omitted). The Court concluded that since Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, id. at
694, and Congress was aware of the lower courts' interpretation of Title VI, id. at 696-97, the
interpretation of an implied private cause of action reflected congressional intent with respect
to Title IX. Id. at 697-98.

1448

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1433

private parties could state a cause of action under Title VI in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission,116 but failed to reach a unified
result. The Justices differed sharply as to the nature of relief available to

private plaintiffs and the basis for which such relief would be awarded.I

7

The resulting patchwork of opinions in Guardiansprescribes the following parameters for private suits under Title VI: Victims of intentional

discrimination may sue public recipients of federal assistance for compensatory as well as prospective relief,11 8 and victims of unintentional
1

discrimination may sue public recipients for prospective relief only. 19
The net effect of Guardiansis that male minority plaintiffs who wish
to challenge educational test use will have limited remedies available to

them. They may be precluded from bringing private Title VI actions

against private universities.1 0 In addition, the extent of relief available
in suits against public universities will depend on whether they allege and

then prove that they are victims of intentional discrimination. 2 ' By con116. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). In Guardians,black and Hispanic police officers challenged the
New York City Police Department's use of written examinations which resulted in minority
officers being hired later and fired sooner than their white counterparts. Id. at 585. Plaintiffs
alleged that the lay-offs violated their rights under Title VI. Id. at 586.
117. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, found that where the statutory violations
resulted from unintentional discrimination, Title VI allowed only prospective relief ordering
compliance with the terms of the grant. Id. at 601-02 (opinion of White, J.). However, he
found that victims of intentionaldiscrimination were entitled to compensatory as well as prospective relief. Id. at 597, 602-03 (opinion of White, J.). In contrast, Justice Marshall found
that private plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory relief for all violations involving programs
with a racially discriminatory, effect. Id. at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, found that the plaintiffs
in Guardianswere entitled to both prospective and retroactive compensatory relief because
they sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides for a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by all valid federal laws. Id. at 638 (Stevens, I., dissenting). Because Justice Stevens
found that defendants' actions violated the Title VI regulations rather than Title VI itself, he
justified awarding private relief to the plaintiffs via their section 1983 claim and did not
squarely address the issue of whether such relief was warranted under Title VI alone. Id. at
645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens' opinion left unanswered the question
of whether a similar action would be available against a private party. Id. at 645 n. 18 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Stevens stated that this case did not present
the issue of whether a cause of action against private parties exists directly under the regulations. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). None of the Justices addressed whether private causes of
action could be maintained against a private recipient, probably because the defendant in
Guardianswas a public municipal department.
118. See id. at 597, 602-03 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 625-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id.
at 635, 638-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 601-03 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 638-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Whether private causes of action under Title VI can be maintained against private
recipients of government funds was neither raised nor discussed in Guardians. See supra note
117 for further discussion.
121. Guardians,463 U.S. at 601-02 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 625 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 638, 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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trast, the Cannon decision does not expressly limit the nature of relief
available to private Title IX plaintiffs.12 z Although many courts, including the Supreme Court, have repeatedly noted that Congress intended
Title VI and Title IX to be coextensive with one another,12 3 the statutes
as interpreted by the Supreme Court appear inconsonant with respect to
the private cause of action issue.

3. Proving statutory violations
As a result of the Civil Rights Restoration Act amendments, universities may not engage in admission and financial aid practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, or gender.124
However, in order to prevail in a Title VI or Title IX challenge, plaintiffs

must show that the university practices in question resulted in discrimination in violation of those statutes.
Of paramount importance to plaintiffs is the issue of whether proof

of discriminatory intent is required to establish violations of Title VI and
Title IX, or whether proof of discriminatory impact will suffice. The

Supreme Court attempted to settle this issue for Title VI claims in
Guardians.
In a deeply divided decision, a plurality of the Court found that
violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. 12' The
122. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693-94 (establishing private cause of action without mention of
specific limitations on available forms of relief). Subsequent to Cannon, courts have allowed
private Title IX suits to proceed where plaintiffs alleged either disparate-impact discrimination
or intentional discrimination. See Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (allegations of disparate-impact discrimination); Fulani v. League of Women
Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allegations of disparate-impact discrimination); Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (allegations of intentional
discrimination). Regarding the nature of relief available, courts have differed with respect to
whether damages are available in Title IX actions. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago,
660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (no damages granted); Beehler, 664 F. Supp. at 940 (money
damages allowed).
123. See, e.g., Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 566-70 (citing congressional record on Title
VI to determine whether private college students' receipt of federal financial aid funds triggers
Title IX coverage); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683-85 (citing Title VI decisions to determine whether
private right of action exists under Title IX); Sharif,709 F. Supp. at 360-61 (applying Title VI
standards to determine whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent to prevail in Title
IX action).
124. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), § 6, 102 Stat.
28, 31 (1988) (codified respectively as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-4a
(West Supp. 1989)). See also supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
125. Guardians,463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring). In Part II of his opinion, Justice Powell, citing his prior opinion in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, stated
that" 'Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause...' ". 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978). Id (Powell, J., concurring) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in
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remaining five Justices stated that proof of discriminatory impact would
suffice,12 6 but they took different paths to this result. Only two of the

Justices, Justice White and Justice Marshall agreed that Title
VI itself
27
proscribes unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination.1

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun,
stated that although petitioners had to prove invidious intent to prove a
violation of the statute, they only had to prove discriminatory effect in
order to prove a violation of valid federal law embodied in the Title VI
regulations.2 ' Thus, to avoid proving intent, plaintiffs must allege that a

defendant has violated Title VI implementing regulations which specifi29
cally prohibit practices having a discriminatory effect.'

At first glance, the Guardiansdecision does not appear to clarify the
standard of proof required of Title VI plaintiffs. In the wake of Guardi-

ans, most courts which have been called upon to do so have interpreted
the decision as requiring proof of discriminatory intent to establish violation of the statute. 3 ° However, where plaintiffs sue to enforce regula-

tions incorporating an effects standard, proof of discriminatory effect will
suffice for proof of a prima facie case of discrimination.'
Under the
effects analysis, once plaintiffs establish a prima facie case based on disproportionate impact, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demon-

strate that the practice which caused the impact was required by
Part II of Justice Powell's Guardiansopinion. Guardians,463 U.S. at 607. See also id. at 615
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Guardians,463 U.S. at 593 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("I agree with Justice White that proof of discriminatory animus should not be required [to
establish a violation of Title VII."); id. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 593 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The split in Guardians results from a discrepancy in Title VI interpretation created by prior decisions in Bakke and Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the Court adopted an "effects test" to determine violation of Title VI,
holding that the statute prohibited use of federal funds in any program or practice which had
the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568. Four years later in
Bakke, five Justices agreed that Title VI would proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate constitutional equal protection standards, that is, those classifications which
were intentionally motivated. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring). Since Bakke did not expressly overrule Lau, the Court chose to address
the intent issue in Guardians,463 U.S. at 589, but failed to reach a consensus regarding the
required standard of proof.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 155-58 for discussion of Title VI and Title IX regulations incorporating an effects standard.
130. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) ("V]iolation of Title VI
require[s] proof of discriminatory intent."); Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F.
Supp. 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[Violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory
intent."); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Title VI requires proof of actual intentional discrimination .... ").
131. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 981-82; Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 360-61.
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educational necessity.132
The Title IX decisions subsequent to Guardiansare in accord. 3 3 By
analogizing to Title VI, courts have consistently required plaintiffs to
prove intent in order to establish violation of Title IX, but have applied
an effects analysis where plaintiffs brought suit under Title IX regulations incorporating an effects standard.134
Two post-Guardianstesting cases illustrate how courts have used an
effects analysis to resolve wrongful test-use claims. In Larry P. v.
Riles, 35 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction
prohibiting California schools from using IQ tests for class placement
where the use of the tests resulted in a disproportionate number of black
children being placed in classes for the educable mentally retarded
(EMR).13 6 Because the plaintiffs brought suit under Title VI effects-stan37
dard regulations, the court applied a discriminatory- effect analysis.
The court found that the discriminatory impact of the challenged tests
was undisputed1 38 because black children generally scored fifteen points
lower than white children, 139 and as a result, black children constituted
27% of the EMR classes even though they were only 9% of the total
state school population. 14 The court rejected the defendants' argument
that IQ tests were necessary to determine EMR placement because defendants failed to prove that the tests accurately predicted that black elementary schoolchildren with scores at or below 70 were mentally
retarded and incapable of learning the regular school curriculum 14 1 and
because the tests were never validated for the class placement of black
142
children.
In Sharifv. New York State Education Department,4 3 the plaintiffs
alleged that state college scholarship distribution based exclusively on
132. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982.
133. See Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 360; Fulani,684 F. Supp. at 1193; Nagel v. Avon Bd. of
Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105, 109-10 (D. Conn. 1983).
134. Sharif,709 F. Supp. at 360; Fulani, 684 F. Supp. at 1193.
135. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
136. Id at 972.
137. Id. at 981-82.
138. Id. at 982-83.
139. Id. at 975.
140. Id. at 973.

141. Id. at 980.
142. Id. The IQ tests would be "valid for placement" only if they could specifically predict
that schoolchildren who score below 70 are mentally retarded and incapable of learning the
regular school curriculum. Id. In addition, studies examining the IQ tests found that
although the tests were valid for placement of white schoolchildren, such validation for blacks
had only been assumed and not established. Id. at 980-81.
143. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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SAT scores violated the gender discrimination prohibitions of Title
IX. 4 Analogizing first to Title VI, 145 the court proceeded under a discriminatory-effect analysis because the plaintiffs sued under Title IX regulations proscribing the use of any test "which has a disproportionately
adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex .... "146 Because the state
based scholarship award eligibility solely on SAT scores, men consistently received substantially more scholarships than women.147 In 1987,
the year immediately preceding the Sharif litigation, men comprised
47% of the scholarship competitors but received 72% of the Empire
State Scholarships and 57% of the Regent Scholarships.' 48 The court
found that the disparity in scholarship distribution between men and wo49
men established a prima facie showing of discriminatory impact.'
Next, the court found that because the plaintiffs showed that a
facially neutral practice had had a disproportionate effect on women, the
burden must shift to the defendants to prove a manifest relationship between use of the SAT and recognition of high school achievement.' 50
The court then stated that because the SAT was not designed or validated for measuring high school achievement, 1 5 ' the defendants failed to
show a reasonable relationship between their practice of predicating
scholarship distribution solely on SAT scores and their purpose of rewarding high school achievement." 2 Finally, the plaintiffs presented a
feasible alternative to sole reliance on the SAT by proposing that scholarships could be distributed based on a combination of grade point averages and SAT scores.'5 3 As a result of the foregoing analysis, the court
found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Title IX claim
and, therefore, enjoined the state from predicating scholarship distribu54
tion on SAT scores.'
a. the primafacie case: proving disproportionateimpact
What do Guardiansand its progeny forecast for plaintiffs who wish
to challenge a university's admissions decision? First, plaintiffs must sue
144. Id. at 348. The plaintiffs also alleged that this practice violated their fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection. Id. at 348.
145. Id. at 360-61 (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)).
146. Id. at 361 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b)(2) (1988)).
147. Id. at 355.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 362.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 362-64.
154. Id. at 364.
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under the regulations in order to avoid proving intentional discrimination. 5 Title IX regulations specifically prohibit the use of any test in the
admissions process which has a disproportionate, adverse effect on students on the basis of gender. 56 Title VI regulations state that funding
recipients may not utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their
race, color, or national origin.157 In addition, Title VI regulations require all institutions of higher education applying for federal grants to
refrain from discrimination in admission practices and all other practices
58
relating to the treatment of students.
When plaintiffs sue under regulations incorporating an effects standard, the first question they must confront is how much impact suffices
for the prima facie case. 'Title VII regulations provide mathematical formulae to help courts determine whether an apparent impact is statistically significant.15 9 However, .neither Title VI nor Title IX regulations
provide such statistical guidance. In the absence of Title VI and Title IX
regulations to guide a prima facie determination, the Larry P. and Sharif
cases may guide future plaintiffs in estimating the sufficiency of their own
prima facie case. In Larry P., the plaintiffs established a prima facie case
where test use resulted in black schoolchildren being placed in classes for
the mentally retarded in numbers that constituted three times their proportion in the state school population."6 In Sharif,plaintiffs established
a prima facie case where women constituted over half of scholarship applicants but were awarded less than a third of the scholarships.161
The problem with proving the disproportionate impact of college
admission test use is that the impact may not be severe enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. For example, women account
for 52% of the SAT test-taking population. 62 However, at the nation's
155. See Guardians,463 U.S. at 593 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 644-45 (Stevens, ., dissenting). See also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 981; Sharif,709 F.
Supp. at 365.
156. 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b)(2) (1988).
157. Id. § 100.3(b)(2).
158. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(1) (1989).
159. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.18
(1989). Section 1607.4D provides that a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which
is less than four-fifths of the rate for the group with the highest selection rate will generally be
regarded as evidence of adverse impact. Id. § 1607.4D.
160. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 973. Black children constituted 9% of the state's school population but 27% of the EMR classes. Id.
161. Sharif,709 F. Supp. at:355, Although men represented'only 47% of the scholarship
competitors, they received 72% of'the: Empire State Scholarships and 57% -of the Regents
Scholarships. Id.
162. COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT, supra note 29, at iv, 1.
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"most competitive" coeducational colleges 6 3 which use SAT results in

their admissions processes, the percentage of women in the enrolled population ranges from 16% to 51% with an average of 41.3%.6 4 By comparison to Sharif-which is the only Title IX case invoking a disparate

impact analysis-this disparity may not be enough to prove prima facie
discrimination in a Title IX suit against one of these universities.
Even if a court found these statistics sufficient to establish prima
facie discrimination, colleges might contest the manner in which the statistics were computed. Rather than comparing the percentage of women
who take the SAT with the percentage of women enrolled at competitive
universities, colleges might urge the court to compare the percentage of
women who apply to the competitive universities with the percentage of

women enrolled. Statistics on application and admission rates indicate
that the admission rates for women are generally equal to or greater than
the admission rates of men at all the competitive universities.165 Com-

paring admission rates at these colleges indicates no disparate impact on
women by virtue of SAT use in college admissions. What the admission
rates do indicate is the influence of the SAT on self-selection. That is,
women who may be qualified to attend these universities decide not to

apply because they perceive themselves to be inadmissible and unqualified on the basis of their SAT scores. 166 However, detrimental self-selection engendered by SAT results is not actionable under Title IX.167

Proving disparate impact for minority students in a Title VI action
involves similar issues as in Title IX. Two sample situations illustrate the
problematic aspects of pressing Title VI claims with respect to test use in
higher education. The first situation involves analysis of minority stu163. See ARCO, THE RIGHT COLLEGE 1989 xxviii (1989). The list of the "most competitive" coeducational colleges includes: Amherst, Bowdoin, Brown, California Institute of
Technology, Carleton, Columbia, Cooper Union, Cornell, Dartmouth, Duke, Georgetown,
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, University of Michigan, Middlebury, Northwestern, Notre
Dame, Princeton, Rice, Stanford, Swarthmore, Union, The Air Force Academy, The Naval
Academy, University of Virginia, Webb Institute, Wesleyan, Williams, and Yale. Id.
164. See infra Appendix A. These figures do not include statistics for Wellesley College,
The Air Force Academy, or The Naval Academy.
165. See infra Appendix B for statistics on admission rates.
166. SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 4145.
[W]hen estimating their math and English abilities, both men and women perceived
their abilities to be more in line with their test scores than with their grades. Unfortunately, this meant that girls believed themselves to be less able than their grades
would indicate, and less able than boys. And girls were less likely to aspire to
"super-elite" colleges.
Id. at 45.
167. Title IX addresses itself only to the decisions and practices of educational institutions.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). Consequently, a high school student's decision not to apply to a
university cannot serve as the basis for a Title IX action.
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dent enrollment in selective private colleges; the second situation involves analysis of minority student enrollment patterns in a state public
college system.
Using black and Hispanic students as an example, College Board
statistics indicate that these students account for 14% of the SAT taking
population. 168 However, on average, the same students account for only
8.86% of the "most competitive" private college population, with populations on individual campuses ranging from 1% to 18%.169 As the competitive level of the college shifts downward, the percentage of black and
Hispanic students in the college population increases. 170 In California,
for example, the black and Hispanic student population at first-tier state
schools-University of California schools-is 12%, but at second-tier
state schools-the Cal State system-the population rises to 18.72%. 171
In the two-year junior colleges which have open admission policies and
do not require SAT scores, the black and Hispanic student population

averages 23.31%.172
These statistics present a muddy picture with respect to possible Title VI claims. Under Larry P., an 8.67% average minority student population in selective private colleges compared with 14% population at
large may suffice for prima facie proof of disproportionate impact. However, admission rates at individual colleges may prove that limited minority student enrollment is a function of low application rates among
minority candidates more than low SAT scores. The College Board advises students to use their PSAT and SAT results to refine their college
application choices by comparing their own test scores to the score
ranges for admitted students at each college. 173 Consequently, it is likely
that self-selection is having a dramatic effect on black and Hispanic students' application rates to competitive colleges and universities. As
stated with respect to Title IX claims, student self-selection which results
in disproportionate enrollments is not actionable under Title VI.
The enrollment pattern exhibited in the California state college system 174 also calls for Title VI scrutiny. Here, the minority students are
clustered at the bottom of the educational tracks at the least selective and
168. COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT, supra note 29, at 6.
169. See infra Appendix A. Webb Institute reports Hispanic enrollment of 1%. Stanford
University reports black enrollment of 8% and Hispanic enrollment of 10%. Id.
170. See infra Appendices A, C, and D.
171. See infra Appendix C.
172. See infra Appendix D.
173. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 74-75 (quoting COLLEGE ENTRANCE
EXAMINATION BOARD, ABOUT YOUR 1983 PSAT/NMSQT SCORES 14 (1984)).
174. See infra Appendices C and D for enrollment statistics.
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least rigorous schools.17 ' National, statistie,iidicate that minority students are generally overrepresented. in -the junior, college population as

compared to their representation m the colle population as a whole. 176

The California college enrollment pattern parallels the elementary school

EMR placement patterns at issue-in Larry,P.' But there is one big difference between these two cases. In Laity P.,. the disproportionate class
placement was directly linked to IQ test.use:"7 7 In the California college

system, it is likely that other non-testing factors, such as cost and location, are influencing'college enrollment pat'terns.'. Hence it-may be difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the'.SAT' requirement as the main
178
determinant of college level placement for minority students.
b.

the "educationalfiecessity" issue and alternbtive
nq-disccimmfatoryuses q the SA T

If a plaintiff can establish a: prima facie case of disproportionate impact, a defendant college may rebut the iiiference of discrimination by
showing that use of the SAT is an "educational *necessity" in the student
selection process."

9

To do this, a defendant must show a rational rela-

tionship between the practice of using the SAT and the purpose for using
it, that is, to admit the students who are most likely to succeed in col-

lege."

If a defendant succeeds in proving educational necessity, plain-

tiffs can still prevail if they can demonstrate that an alternative practice
181
to reliance on the SAT will reduce the disparate impact at issue.
175. See infra Appendices C and D.
176. S. BRINT & J. KARABEL, supra note 25, at 137. Minority students are overrepresented
not only in the community colleges themselves, but also in the vocational tracks within those
colleges. Id.
177. See Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 948-50.
178. For example, state colleges and community colleges are less expensive than state universities, and more local, thereby enabling students to live at home and commute rather than
incur dormitory or off-campus housing expenses which are endemic to university life. S.
BRINT & J. KARABEL, supra note 25, at 154-55. Cost and location are factors known to be
more important to community college students than university students in the decision process. See id. Therefore, it is likely that cost and location are also important to minority community college students and may contribute to a minority student's decision to attend a
community college.
179. LarryP., 793 F.2d at 983 ("[D]efendants [had] to demonstrate that thb IQ tests which
resulted in the disproportionate placement of black children were required by educational
necessity.").
180. Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 362 ("[Defendants must show a manifest relationship between
use of the SAT and recognition and award of academia achievement in high school.").
181. Id.
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i. women applicants
For women, the educational necessity issue is fairly straightforward.
In Sharif, the defendants' conceded purpose in awarding state scholar-2
8
ship money was to reward students who had excelled in high school.1
However, the court noted that the SAT was designed to predict college
performance and not designed to measure achievement in high school."' 3
Therefore, the court rejected the defendants' claim that use of SAT
scores to distribute scholarship money was reasonably related to the pur84
pose of rewarding high school achievement.1
Plaintiffs who challenge college admission or scholarship distribution decisions predicated on SAT results will have to prove that, in fact,
the SAT does not predict college success for women reliably enough to
constitute an educational necessity in the admission or scholarship distribution process. In order to rebut plaintiffs' claim, defendant colleges
would present studies demonstrating the relationship between students'
SAT scores and freshman grade point averages."' 5 Most of these studies
show that, in general, using SAT results improves the prediction of freshman grades.18 6 However, researchers at the College Board and at independent institutions have discovered that women generally achieve
higher first-year college grade point averages than men do, even though
the men receive higher SAT scores. 187 Consequently, a single prediction
formula for both men and women will indicate that women applicants
are likely to be less successful in college than they actually prove to be
once they enroll.' 88 This suggests that, for women, the SAT is not fulfilling its primary purpose of predicting first-year college grades. 189 As a
result, SAT use in admissions may cause fewer women to be admitted to
the college than are actually qualified to attend. 90 If the purpose of a
college's student selection process is to select applicants who are most
182. Id. at 354.
183. Id. at 362.
184. Id.
185. The College Board has its own Validity Study Service, run by ETS, which aids colleges
in developing formulae to predict freshman grades based on SAT scores. J.CROUSE & D.
TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 41. Colleges then use the predicted performance estimates generated by these formulae to assess applicant eligibility. Id. The Validity Study Service also
encourages colleges to study the effectiveness of the predictive formulae that they use, by comparing predicted grade point averages with actual grade point averages achieved. Id. at 42.
186. Id. at 43.
187. Wilder & Powell, supra note 31, at 4; SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 23.
188. Wilder & Powell, supra note 31, at 4.
189. SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 23.
190. See supra note 185 for an explanation of how prediction formulae based on SAT scores
affect student selection.
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likely to succeed academically in that college, using the SAT in the above
described manner cannot be defended as "reasonably related" to that
purpose. Therefore, defendant colleges and universities to whom this
grade versus test score discrepancy applies cannot validly demonstrate
the educational necessity of gender-neutral use of SAT scores in their
admissions processes.
Even if defendants prevail on the educational necessity issue, plaintiffs may prevail on the third element of the disparate impact claim by
establishing that alternative selection procedures exist which do not adversely affect women applicants. Without eliminating the SAT from the
admission process altogether, colleges can avoid disparate impact by using gender-specific prediction formulae. Researchers have demonstrated
that separate prediction equations for women and men more closely predict their college performance than a prediction equation developed
without regard to gender.19 A gender-specific prediction process will,
therefore, enable a college to increase the accuracy of its admission decisions. In addition, this type of process will increase the number of women admitted to competitive colleges, thereby decreasing the adverse
impact on women which results from gender-neutral use of test scores. 192
ii.

minority applicants

The educational necessity issue for minority plaintiffs is more of a
hurdle. As in the case of women, the SAT is not a very accurate predictor of minority student college achievement. 193 Using black students as
an example, researchers have found that prediction equations based on
combined samples of blacks and whites typically overpredict first year
college grades for blacks. 9 4 That is, for black students, SAT scores tend
to predict that they will receive higher grades than they actually do. 195
Colleges may use these statistics to establish that SAT use is reasonably
related to their purpose of selecting students who will be academically
successful because the overprediction not only causes them to admit students who in fact prove to be academically successful, it also allows them
to admit students who eventually prove to be unsuccessful. 196 Therefore,
defendants will argue, SAT use in college admission is not harming black
191. Wilder & Powell, supra note 31, at 4; SAT Gender Gap, supra note 1, at 92.
192. The College Board itself cautions colleges about the possible effects of gender-neutral
use of test scores. See infra text accompanying note 243.
193. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 96-106.
194. See id. at 96-106 for a discussion of the effects of overprediction. "Overpredict" is a
statistical term for "overestimate." See id. at 96.
195. Id. at 96.
196. This rebuttal raises the issue of whether plaintiffs would even have standing to sue.
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applicants, and in fact is an educational necessity in the admission
process.
However, minority plaintiffs may still attempt to defeat educational
necessity claims by proposing alternative practices which avoid discriminatory impact and still achieve a defendant's desired result. Two alternatives exist which would achieve this goal. The first involves eliminating
the SAT from the admission process entirely. A recent study reveals that
eliminating SAT use in college admissions and relying on high school
grades and class rank instead would increase the number of black students admitted to college. 197 However, this increase results from the fact
that high school grades overpredict black student college performance
more than the SAT does. 198 Consequently, adding the SAT to class rank
improves the predictive validity of the admissions process as a whole,
even though it also causes more black students to be denied admission. 199
Therefore, eliminating the SAT is not an alternative which would achieve
a defendant's goal of admitting those students most likely to succeed. In
fact, evidence of the probable effects of eliminating the SAT would
strengthen a defendant's claim that the SAT is an educational necessity
in their selection process.
The second proposed alternative requires consideration of whether
students who were rejected for admission might have succeeded academically if they instead had been admitted. This is the problem of false negatives. 2" A single admissions decision can produce four possible results,
two of which are "correct" results, and two of which are "incorrect." 20 1
Correct results occur when an admitted student proves to be academically successful, and when the rejected student is one who in fact would
not have been successful. 202 Incorrect results occur when an admitted
student later proves to be unsuccessful or when a rejected student would
in fact have been successful.2 0 The last of these four possibilities-the
rejected student who would have been academically successful-is labeled a "false negative." 2"
However, plaintiffs denied admission or scholarship money may present that denial as the
requisite injury-in-fact to satisfy standing requirements.
197. J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM supra note 13, at 99.

198. Id. at 98-99.
199. Id. at 98-102.
200. Id. at 103.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. A college attempts to minimize false positives by using statistical regression equations which predict likely college performance based on indices such as SAT scores and high
school grades. Id. at 40-42 (discussion of predicted performance equations). The college seeks
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If one ethnic group receives more than its proportional share of low
SAT scores, a greater proportion of that group is more likely to be rejected by colleges and also more likely to be rejected erroneously as false
negatives. 205 Recent research on this issue demonstrates that a colorblind admissions practice utilizing SAT results increases false negative
decisions for black students.20 6 That is, SAT use in these cases results in
denial of admission to black students who would in fact have been successful if admitted. However, the same research demonstrates that SAT
use also decreases false positive decisions for black students---erroneous
decisions in which an admitted student proves unsuccessful.20 7 Therefore, SAT use is simultaneously producing two outcomes, one of whichthe reduction of false positives-is as desirable from a college's point of
view as the other-the increase in false negatives-is undesirable from a
black student's point of view.
The challenge for plaintiffs is to convince a court that a selection
procedure designed to minimize false positives is less rational than one
which accounts for false negatives as well. A plaintiff should argue that a
selection procedure is rational if it results in the same proportion of false
negatives for all identifiable culture groups in the applicant pool. That is,
a selection procedure is only rational if it "erroneously" denies admission
to equal proportions of white students and black students.
Redistribution of false negatives begins with redistribution of denials
of admission.20 8 This type of redistribution would require colleges to
raise the SAT requirements for white students and lower the SAT requirements for nonwhites so that slightly fewer whites are admitted and
slightly fewer nonwhites are rejected. Therefore, generating a pro rata
distribution of false negatives requires utilization of race-specific admissions criteria. While colleges might undertake such a practice voluntarily, it is unlikely that a court would order a college defending a Title VI
claim to institute this system involuntarily.20 9
to maximize the number of successful students admitted by admitting the students for whom
the regression equation indicates likely academic success. Id. As a result, selection procedures designed to minimize false positive decisions give no weight to the resulting number of
false negative decisions.
205. Id. at 99, 105.
206. Id. at 106.
207. Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 200-07 for a discussion of false negatives.
209. For a discussion of the difference between court-ordered affirmative action remedies
and judicial deference to voluntary affirmative action programs in the Title VII context, see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1539-42 (2d ed. 1988). Court-ordered affirmative
action is generally limited in scope and is reserved as a remedy for past intentional discrimination. Id. at 1539-41 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (Court plurality
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C. The ConstitutionalClaims
In addition to statutory claims, plaintiffs may challenge test use
under federal and state constitutions. The discussion in this section fo-

cuses on federal constitutional claims. However, litigants should not
hesitate to bring suit under applicable state constitutional provisions because state constitution claims may afford them broader relief.21 0 State
courts may construe state constitution counterparts of the federal Bill of
Rights more liberally than the federal provisions, thereby guaranteeing

citizens of their own state additional protection. 11
1. Establishing coverage: the state action problem

The most probable constitutional claims for plaintiffs alleging discrimination based on test use are federal fourteenth amendment equal

protection claims,212 or analogous state constitution provisions.213 However, private conduct is not actionable under the fourteenth amendment
unless the challenged conduct involves some element of state action.21 4
Under current doctrine, establishing state action under the federal constitution is extremely difficult.2 15 However, some state courts have found
state action for state constitutional purposes where defendants engaged
delineates guidelines for determining whether race-conscious remedies may be judicially imposed); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (courtordered affirmative action remedy upheld where union had persistently refused to admit minority workers)). See also id. at 1541 n.104 (quoting Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) ("[T]he
general point remains that voluntary affirmative action plans should not be inhibited by the
separation-of-powers concerns that limit the judiciary from fashioning affirmative action plans
justified by forward-looking rather than narrower remedial concerns.")).
210. See, e.g., Comment, "No Pass, No Play" Equal Protection Analysis Under the Federal
and State Constitutions, 63 IND. L.J. 161, 168-79 (1987) (discussion of equal protection analysis under state constitutions).
211. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 495 (1977). In this article, Justice Brennan encourages lawyers to pursue state
constitution claims in civil rights cases. Id. at 502. He also encourages state judges to develop
independent standards of review for state constitutional claims rather than adopt standards set
forth by the Supreme Court for analogous federal constitutional claims. I1d. at 501-02. See
also DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (B. McGraw ed. 1985) (collection of
essays and articles submitted at 1984 Williamsburg conference on state constitutional law);
Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1269 (1985).
212. See infra text accompanying notes 221-44 for substantive discussion of equal protection claims.
213. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; MAsS. CONST., part I, art. I; PA. CONST. art. I., § 1.
214. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[T]he action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States.").
215. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988); Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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in conduct which would be unlikely to suffice for state action under the
federal constitution.2 16

A state college or university, being a public institution which is fully
administered and financially supported by the state, is by definition a

"state actor," and therefore owes the full scope of constitutional protections to its students and applicants.2 1 7 By comparison, private universi-

ties are likely to owe their students no constitutional duties because
courts are reluctant to find that a private university has engaged in state
action.2 1 The United States Supreme Court has not developed a uniform test for determining when state action exists, but has adopted a
number of separate approaches in which the facts and circumstances at

issue must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to determine
whether state action is present. 21 9 However, none of these approaches is

likely to result in a finding that a private university is sufficiently tied to
220
the state so that its actions may be subjected to constitutional scrutiny.

216. Compare Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (state regulation and grant of exclusive franchise to telephone
service company held sufficient to impose state constitutional duty on telephone company)
with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (privately owned utility, licensed by state agency and subject to extensive state regulation is not state actor under federal
constitution). See also Friesen, supra note 211, at 1276-80 for general discussion of state action
under California, New Jersey, Florida, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Illinois constitutions.
217. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968).
218. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837; Cohen v. President & Fellows of Harvard
College, 729 F.2d 59 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Russell v. Salve Regina
College, 649 F. Supp. 391 (D.R.I. 1986). See also infra note 220.
219. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
220. When the state insinuates itself into a position of interdependence with the private
actor, it may be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. Id. at 725. Plaintiffs have litigated the state action status of private universities under the interdependence
standard in various contexts. A university will not be deemed a state actor by virtue of the fact
that it holds a government granted charter, Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d
556, 559-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975), or because one of its educational
programs is moderately regulated by the state. Russell, 649 F. Supp. at 397 (fact that college's
nursing program was subject to state approval in certain respects was insufficient to establish
state action on part of college which dismissed nursing student). State regulation of university
activities will not result in a state action finding unless the challenged action is directly compelled by state regulation. See eg., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 ("Here the decisions to
discharge the petitioners were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation.");
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010 (state and federal regulations regarding treatment of nursing home
patients encouraged patient transfers but did not expressly dictate challenged transfer decisions); Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1988) (state law requiring university
to adopt disciplinary rules does not render as state action university action pursuant to those
rules). But see also Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984) (state
action found where statutory scheme involved state in all levels of university administration).
Courts which have addressed government funding issues have generally held that government funding of a private university alone is not sufficient to establish state action. See Cohen,
729 F.2d at 60 (suit by former professor alleging dismissal violated first and fifth amendment
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Equal protection analysis

a. fundamental rights
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination based on test use may assert federal
rights); Greenya, 512 F.2d at 556 (suit by former professor alleging dismissal violated first and
fifth amendment rights); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (law
professor sued university alleging salary increase was denied in violation of first amendment
rights); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.) (associate professor sued university
alleging removal from research project violated first and fifth amendment rights), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 874 (1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (students
alleged expulsion from law school violated first and sixth amendment rights and fourteenth
amendment due process rights); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (students challenged suspension from university alleging violation of first amendment and fourteenth amendment due process rights). See also Wahba, 492 F.2d at 102 (requirement that
university comply with anti-discrimination statutes in order to receive federal funds does not
impose constitutional duties on university not included in that statute). State actor status does
not ensue from government funding even where virtually all of a school's income is derived
from government sources. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837 (privately run school for maladjusted high school students not state actor even though state tuition funding comprised over
90% of school operating budget). Where plaintiffs have sought to establish state action based
on a university's tax-exempt status, courts have generally held that tax-exempt status does not
constitute sufficient government involvement in a university to establish state action because it
does not involve the government in the management of the organization. Greenya, 512 F.2d at
559-60; see also Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969). However, it should be
noted that even though state actor status is not likely to flow from the tax-exempt status of a
private school, courts have not hesitated to revoke the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory schools or organizations. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971). However, revocation of tax-exempt status has been reserved for severe situations, such
as where schools maintain express policies restricting admission for whites only. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574.
Another context in which private conduct may constitute state action is where the private
actor performs a public function. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (companyowned town which maintained privately supported police services, privately owned roads and
sidewalks, and which was accessible to and freely used by the public in general was required to
guarantee constitutional liberties to its residents just as if it were publicly owned municipality).
But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (owners of private shopping mall not
required to guarantee first amendment rights of anti-war protestors wishing to distribute leaflets at the mall). Under the public function analysis, the function at issue must be one which is
normally an exclusive state function in order for private administration of it to be subject to
constitutional scrutiny. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (citing Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)) (Court declined to deem private school
state actor on basis of public function analysis; even though education of maladjusted high
school students was in fact public function, it was not exclusive province of State, and therefore was insufficient basis for state action to attach). It is unlikely that a plaintiff would succeed in establishing state action based on the fact that a private university provides a public
function. Several courts have rejected the public function argument on the basis that education has never been a state monopoly in this country, even at the primary and secondary school
level. See, eg., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court itself has
contrasted an educational institution with other facilities which traditionally serve the community, remarking that a school might engage in certain discriminatory practices and not be
subject to constitutional scrutiny so long as it does not involve the state in its management or
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equal protection claims against public universities. They may also assert
equal protection claims against private universities in the event that state

action can be established. In addition, plaintiffs may be able to assert a
parallel state constitutional claim.2"'

Equal protection violations may

arise in two contexts. The "fundamental rights" context involves situations where an official action denies one group of citizens equal access to
a fundamental right.22 In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,2 2 3 the Supreme Court concluded that education is not a fun-

damental right.224 Consequently, the Court held that official action
which creates a disparity in access to educational opportunities will not
trigger strict equal protection scrutiny. 225 The Court hinted that an out-

right denial of educational opportunities may violate equal protection
standards. 2 26 However, state practices affecting relative levels of avail-

able opportunity will not violate equal protection prescriptions so long as
those practices bear some rational relationship to legitimate state
purposes.22 7
The Rodriguez decision effectively precludes successful fundamental
rights challenges to higher education test use. If public elementary and
secondary school.education is not a fundamental right, it is unlikely that
college education is a fundamental right.2 2 8 In addition, standardized
control. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966) ("If a testator wanted to leave a
school or center for the use of one race only and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control, or management of that facility, we assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered."). Therefore, although a private university serves the public by
providing education, that public service is not sufficiently tied to the state in order to bring the
protections of the Constitution along with it.
221. Few state constitutions contain an equal protection clause. However, several states
have adopted equal rights amendments prohibiting some forms of gender discrimination. See
Williams, Equality and State ConstitutionalLaw, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71, 80-81 (B. McGraw ed. 1985). Although many state courts analyze state
equal protection claims according to the suspect class/fundamental right models developed by
the United States Supreme Court, some of them have reached different results from those of
the Supreme Court. Id. For a detailed discussion regarding similarities and differences in state
and federal equal protection analyses, see Comment, supra note 210.
222. L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at 1458.
223. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
224. Id. at 35. But see Comment, supra note 210, at 169-73 for discussion of fundamental
rights analysis under state constitutions.
225. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
226. Id. at 37 ("Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only
relative differences in spending levels are involved . . .

227. Id. at 40.
228. But see Comment, supra note 210, at 169-73 for examples of states which have held
education to be a fundamental right under their state constitutions.
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test use in higher education is not precluding access to higher education
altogether. At most, test use affects only the relative levels of college
education available to college-bound students.2 2 9 Under Rodriguez, a
practice which generates disparities in the quality of education available
to students will not violate equal protection so long as that practice is
rationally related to a legitimate purpose.230
b. suspect classes and the problem of proving intent
Equal protection violations may also occur where a state law or
practice disproportionately burdens a specific class of persons.2 3 ' Government actions which operate to the detriment of racial and ancestral
groups are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.2 32 Similar actions which
affect persons differently based on their gender are also subject to judicial
scrutiny, but the grounds for invalidating such practices are more stringent than the grounds with respect to race.2 33
Plaintiffs alleging that a practice violates equal protection standards
must first show that the practice in question was motivated by a discriminatory purpose in order to subject the practice to strict scrutiny review.2 34 The Supreme Court formulated the discriminatory purpose
requirement in Washington v. Davis,235 a case involving claims of discrimination based on test use. The plaintiffs in Davis alleged that the
Washington, D.C. Police Department's recruiting practices discriminated against them on the basis of their race. 236 The Department's
recruiting procedure included a verbal skills exam.2 37 The plaintiffs' evidence established that four times as many blacks failed the test than did
whites,2 38 and hence the recruitment process screened out a dispropor229. See infra Appendices A-D for statistics on women and minority student enrollments at
various levels of colleges.
230. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37, 40-41.
231. L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at 1465-66.
232. Id. (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 1561-65 (citations omitted).
234. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). The Davis case involved race discrimination claims. Id. at 233. Plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination must also prove discriminatory purpose as the first step in establishing an equal protection violation. See, eg., Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
235. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
236. Id. at 233. This case involved an employment discrimination claim. However, the
plaintiffs in Davis were unable to bring a Title VII action against the defendant police department because Title VII did not apply to federal government employers when this case was first
filed. Id. at 236 n.6. Therefore, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the fifth amendment. Id. at 233.
237. Id. at 234-35.
238. Id. at 237.
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tionate number of black applicants. 239 However, the Court required the
plaintiffs to show that the defendants instituted the challenged recruiting

practices with a discriminatory purpose, and held that disproportionate
impact alone could not serve as the basis for inferring a discriminatory
purpose. 24°

The Court has discussed guidelines for determining discriminatory
purpose, but has not developed a definitive test. As a result, establishing

discriminatory purpose proved difficult for many plaintiffs who litigated
test use claims subsequent to the Davis case.24 1 The question most rele-

vant to educational testing cases is whether foreseeability of the disproportionate impact of a test-use practice renders a decision to institute
that practice purposely discriminatory. The Court has held that a showing of discriminatory purpose requires proof that the decision-makers se-

lected or reaffirmed a particular course of action in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effect upon a particular group.24 2
Both the College Board and the professional admissions counselors'
association have notified colleges of the possible effects of race and gender neutral test use.24 3 However, foreseeability alone has never supported an unconstitutional test use finding because plaintiffs have been

unable to prove that the decision-makers in question used a particular
test in their selection process because of its discriminatory effect on women or minority applicants. 2 "
239. Id. at 235.
240. Id. at 242.
241. See, eg., Jones v. Board of Comm'rs of the Alabama State Bar, 737 F.2d 996, 1004
(11 th Cir. 1984) (proof that Bar Examiners practices resulted in adverse disproportionate impact on passage rates of black applicants was insufficient to support equal protection violation);
Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 1984) (equal protection findings of district court
reversed because plaintiffs' showing of pervasive disproportionate impact insufficient to establish discriminatory intent); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980) (case
remanded for further findings to show discriminatory intent on part of school board); Delgado
v. McTighe, 522 F. Supp. 886, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (minority plaintiffs failed to carry burden
of proof with respect to equal protection claim where evidence showed Bar Examiners' practice disproportionately burdened minority applicants but no evidence showed practice was motivated by discriminatory purpose).
242. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
243. See COLLEGE BOARD 1988 REPORT, supra note 29 at iii (College Board advises against
exclusive reliance upon SAT to predict college performance); see also Sharif v. New York State
Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court notes that The National Association of College Admission Counselors' Code of Ethics requires member institutions to refrain
from using minimum test scores as sole criterion for admission, and to refrain from using tests
in any manner that may discriminate against students).
244. See, eg., Jones, 737 F.2d at 1004 (rule limiting number of times applicant may sit for
Bar exam does not violate equal protection in absence of showing that defendant instituted rule
because of rule's ultimate adverse effect on minority applicants); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 984
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A.

A Summary of The Difficulties of Litigation

In view of the obstacles discussed above, plaintiffs who bring federal
statutory and constitutional challenges to test use in higher education
face an unlikely chance for success. With respect to the statutory claims,
plaintiffs may only bring Title VI and Title IX claims if a school receives
federal funding.2 45 Although most schools-even private schools-do
receive government funding, schools receiving no government aid will
remain unreachable by the statute.2 46 Even if schools receive funding
sufficient to establish statutory coverage, the nature of relief available to
Title VI plaintiffs bringing private suits may be restricted.24 7 However,
their Title IX counterparts are not expressly restricted in the manner of
relief they may seek.2 4
Plaintiffs who succeed in establishing statutory coverage and who
establish their private right to sue may still have difficulties proving a
statutory violation. In order to avoid the requirement of proving intentional discrimination, plaintiffs must bring suit under regulations incorporating an "effects" standard.24 9
If plaintiffs do bring suit under effects-standard regulations, they
will have to prevail on the basis of a disparate impact analysis. Women
might prevail by presenting alternative selection procedures which minimize the disparate impact on women applicants. 250 However, minority
plaintiffs are less likely to prevail because of the difficulties of establishing
that an alternative use of SAT results would alleviate the disproportionate impact on minority applicants and still serve the defendant's purpose
of admitting the students who are most likely to be academically
251
successful.
Constitutional challenges to test use are more difficult for plaintiffs
to win than statutory claims. First, it is unlikely that a private college
will be sufficiently involved with the state so that its actions may be scru(appeals court reverses district court's equal protection finding which was partially based on
foreseeability argument).

245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
247. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 116-23.
248. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
249. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see also Larry P. v.
Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984); Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also supra text accompanying notes 125-32 and 155-58.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 182-92.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 193-209.
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tinized as state actions.2 52 Therefore, private colleges' activities will not
be within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, and not subject to
constitutional challenge. Although public colleges' activities will be subject to fourteenth amendment constraints, plaintiffs must prove that the
college used standardized tests in its admission process with the purpose
of discriminating against the plaintiff-class in order to get strict scrutiny
review of that process.2 3 For plaintiffs challenging test use, proving discriminatory purpose will be extremely difficult-and probably impossible-to do.
B. Equal Protection Implications of a Legislative
Affirmative Action Remedy
1. A proposed remedy
Litigation is generally an unfavorable option for parties injured by
test use. In addition to the specific obstacles involved in statutory and
constitutional claims, litigation is costly, time consuming, and may produce inconsistent results. Furthermore, the problematic effects of testing
are most evident on a national level. 254 That is, test use in higher education contributes to tracking students into different college levels, with
women and minority students concentrated at the lower educational
255
levels.
An affirmative legislative remedy would effectively address the detrimental effects of standardized test use.25 6 The goal of the legislation
would be to ensure that test use does not result in disproportionate distribution of educational opportunity to the detriment of one gender or race
group.
In order to accomplish this goal, legislatures could require all colleges who use test scores in admissions to "take race into account ' 25 7 in
their decision making process. They could require colleges to implement
an admissions program analogous to the Harvard College program specifically endorsed by Justice Powell in Regents of the University of Call252. See supra text accompanying notes 212-20.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 231-44. Because education is not a fundamental
right, plaintiffs will only be able to get strict scrutiny review of the challenged test-use practice
under the Equal Protection Clause suspect-class doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes
221-30 for discussion of fundamental rights analysis.
254. See, e.g., Appendix A, C and D for statistics.
255. See Appendices A-D.
256. See infra text accompanying note 308.
257. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (describing a permissible alternative to strict racial quotas in admissions).
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fornia v. Bakke2 . as a permissible means of administering a raceconscious admissions process. 259 By requiring colleges to consider the

race or gender of an applicant in evaluating that applicant's objective
qualifications, legislatures could prevent colleges from using exam results

'blindly without regard to the fact that score differentials may distort indicia of an applicant's true ability to succeed in college.
The proposed legislation should apply to all colleges and universities
who use SAT results as a factor in their admissions and scholarship decisions and should include the following provisions:

(1) A college or university must not establish strict cut-off scores for
admission or scholarship decisions;
(2) When evaluating the exam scores of an applicant, administra-

tors must consider the race and gender of that applicant and the national
score differentials reported by the College Board; and,
(3) Administrators must compensate for the score differentials by
taking race and gender into account as positive factors in admission and
scholarship decisions.

2. Assessing the constitutionality of a legislative
affirmative action remedy
a. the affirmative action case law tangle: present standards of review

The Supreme Court has struggled with the constitutionality of government sponsored affirmative action programs four times in the last
twelve years. 26 0 Those cases have produced twenty-three separate opin-

ions, some of which do not reach the constitutional issue.2 61 The Court
first considered the constitutionality of affirmative action in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.2 62 Writing the lead opinion in
Bakke, Justice Powell found that racial quotas in medical school admis-

sions were impermissible,

63

but that a university could take race into

258. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
259. Id. at 316-17 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("In such an admissions program, race or ethnic
background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.").
260. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. grantedsub nom Astroline Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Shurberg, 110 S. Ct.
715 (1990). The four decisions are: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
261. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
262. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
263. Id. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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account as one factor in a multi-factor admissions decision without vio-

lating the strictures of equal protection. 2" Justice Stevens, joined by

Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concurred in
the judgment but decided that the admissions quota was impermissible
on statutory grounds.2 65 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Mar-

shall and Blackmun, found that the quota system and taking race into
account were both constitutionally permissible practices.2 66 Consequently, racial quotas in admission were expressly denounced by five jus-

tices as violative of equal protection principles while considering race in
admissions was simultaneously endorsed by five justices.

Although Bakke indicates that educational affirmative action programs are permissible under certain circumstances, more recent decisions
indicate an increasing reluctance on the part of the Court to tolerate affirmative remedies which burden non-minority groups.2 67 In light of this
trend, Congress itself has become reluctant to institute new affirmative

action programs for fear that such programs would be overturned upon
Supreme Court review.26 8
Much of the dispute among the justices regarding affirmative action
programs concerns the appropriate standard of review for determining a

particular program's constitutionality.26 9 In its most recent affirmative
action decision, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,270 a Court majority

264. Id. at 315-18 (opinion of Powell, J.).
265. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated that whether race could be
used as a factor in admissions was not an issue in the case, and he, therefore, declined to rule
on that issue. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
266. Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
267. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
268. See, eg., Holmes, Bill Would Overturn Court's Rights Decisions, N.Y. Times (nat'l
ed.), Feb. 8, 1990, at A20, col. 4 (legislation introduced to expand Civil Rights Act in response
to several 1989 Court decisions omits mention of affirmative action in order to enhance its
prospect for passage). See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) for the actual text of the
legislation.
269. See, eg., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-99 (opinion of Powell, J.) (arguing for strict scrutiny
of affirmative action programs: "When [classifications] touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."); id. at 359 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for intermediate
scrutiny: "racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' "); see also Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 722 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("[H]eightened scrutiny
[is] appropriate in the circumstances of this case.").
270. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I (facts and procedural history), Ill-B
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agreed that strict scrutiny should be applied to legislation incorporating
race-based classifications, including affirmative action legislation which is
designed to remedy the effects of race discrimination.27 1
The plaintiff in Croson challenged the constitutionality of a city construction plan requiring all prime contractors on city projects to subcontract at least 30% of the contract amount to minority subcontractors.2 72
Applying strict scrutiny analysis to the Richmond plan, the Court stated

that a general claim of past discrimination in a particular industry could
not justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.2 73 The only "compelling
governmental interest" sufficient to pass strict scrutiny would be an inter-

est in rectifying the effects of identified discrimination within the industry and legislative jurisdiction in question.2 74 Even if the city managed to
demonstrate the requisite discrimination, the Court indicated that the
30% set-aside plan would not pass strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination. 27' The Court drew this
conclusion for two reasons. First, the city had adopted the set-aside
without first considering race-neutral alternatives.2 76 And second, the
set-aside figure represented an unrealistic assumption that minorities
would choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their represen-

tation in the total population.277

Croson is unique because it is the first decision in which a majority

of the Justices agreed on a standard of review for affimative action legis(discussion of permissible government interest in enacting race-conscious remedial legislation),
and IV (discussion of requirements for "narrowly tailored" remedy), in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White also joined in Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion (discussion of
federal versus state authority to enact remedial legislation). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White and Justice Kennedy joined in Parts III-A (discussion of strict scrutiny as appropriate
standard of review) and V (findings necessary to establish identified discrimination) of Justice
O'Connor's opinion. Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy filed opinions concurring in part
and concurring in thejudgment. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Brennan and
Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined.
271. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721-22 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("[Tihe standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification.... [H]eightened scrutiny [is] appropriate in the circumstances of
this case."); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree... that strict scrutiny
must be applied to all government classification by race ... .
272. Id. at 712-13.
273. Id. at 724.
274. Id. at 729.
275. Id. at 728.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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lation.2 7' However, the scope of Croson's applicability to subsequent 2af79
firmative action challenges is still the subject of debate among scholars
and federal judges.2 8 0
b. state government implementation of an affirmative remedy
In the wake of Croson, state government power to enact affirmative
educational legislation depends on the effect that that decision has on
Bakke. None of the Justices in Croson disavowed Justice Powell's assertion in Bakke that racial diversity is a constitutionally permissible goal,
independent of any attempt to remedy past discrimination.2 8' Although
the Court has rejected diversity arguments in other contexts, 28 2 arguably
in the narrow context of Bakke-university admissions-diversity is still
a constitutionally permissible goal.2 83 In addition, federal courts which
have adjudicated affirmative action challenges subsequent to Croson have
continued to regard diversity as a constitutionally acceptable goal.284
Therefore, state legislatures should be allowed to regulate test use in
higher education in an effort to increase the racial diversity of educational institutions and to prevent the lack of diversity that might result
from untempered use of test scores.
Once a state legislature seeks to regulate testing in order to further a
compelling state purpose, the specific regulation at issue will only be
278. See Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of
ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1748 (1989).
279. See generally JointStatement: ConstitutionalScholars'Statement on Affirmative Action

After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Fried, Affirmative
Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99
YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Scholars' Reply to ProfessorFried, 99 YALE L.J. 163 (1989).

280. Compare Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing Croson and upholding an FCC minority-preference policy), cert. granted sub
nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990) with Shurberg, 876 F.2d at 91219 (relying on Croson and invalidating an FCC minority-preference policy different from the
policy at issue in Winter Park Communications).
281. See, e.g., Winter Park Communications,873 F.2d at 354 (court relies on the diversity

issue discussed in Bakke for its finding that diversity is a legitimate goal of FCC policy granting licensing preference to minority-owned television stations).
282. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (holding that desire to provide role-models for stu-

dents is not a valid goal permitting granting hiring preference to minority teachers).
283. See Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 913 (D.C. Cir.

1989) ("Aside from remedying past discrimination, the only other state interest heretofore
identified in a Supreme Court opinion and upheld as sufficiently compelling to support raceconscious policies is the promotion of diversity in a school's student body.") (citing Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)), cert.grantedsub nom. Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990).
284. See, e.g., Winter Park Communications, 873 F.2d at 354.

June 1990]

STANDARDIZED TESTING

1473

valid so long as it is then "narrowly tailored" to achieve that purpose. 2 1 5
The proposed legislation which requires consideration of an applicant's
race but does not establish a rigid quota is tailored to the purpose of
fostering diversity on the college campus. This legislation would further
the goal of diversity by ensuring that testing does not serve to screen out
a greater proportion of minority applicants than white applicants by virtue of the fact that white applicants, on average, receive higher scores.
One race-neutral remedy which might alleviate the disparate impact
of test use is a disallowance of testing altogether. Two researchers have
argued that dispensing with the SAT would increase admission of black
students at colleges currently using color-blind admissions criteria.28 6
However, the long-term effects of dropping the SAT are uncertain and
could possibly have a detrimental effect on minority students.2 87
c. federal implementation of an affirmative remedy
Croson clarifies the standard of review likely to be applied in future
challenges to state and local legislative affirmative action plans. However, since the Croson decision involved a local government initiative, it
is arguably of limited relevance to federal affirmative action
challenges.2 8
Several of the Justices in Croson drew distinctions between the respective powers of state and federal governments to legislate remedies for
past discrimination, 2 9 noting that section five of the fourteenth amendment specifically authorizes Congress to enforce the prescriptions of that
amendment. 290 The Court in Croson implied that because state and local
governments do not have similar express authority, 29 1 state and local
government ability to legislate race-based remedial legislation must be
limited and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.29 2
285. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728-29 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).

286. See J. CROUSE & D. TRUSHEIM, supra note 13, at 149.
287. See id. at 148-155. The authors report on the controversy surrounding the possible
impact of dropping the SAT.
288. See Winter Park Communications, 873 F.2d at 354-55; see also Shurberg, 876 F.2d at
941 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
289. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
291. See, e.g., Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719 ("What appellant ignores is that Congress, unlike
any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & White,

J.).
292. Id. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In the process of distinguishing state and federal affirmative action
initiatives, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White suggested that Congress may employ a broader purpose than state governments when it acts
pursuant to its fourteenth amendment enforcement power to address the
effects of discrimination.2 9 3 Justice Scalia also distinguished between the
permissibility of race-based action at the federal versus state level.2 94
This implies that the Court would grant more deference to federal affirm-

ative action legislation than it granted the local legislation in Croson.2 95
Although Croson suggests that a different level of scrutiny would
apply to federal legislation, the precise type of scrutiny to be applied is
still unclear. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,2 96 the Court set forth a rational
basis test as the appropriate standard of review for legislation enacted
pursuant to Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement power.2 97 Arguably then, a rational basis standard should apply to federal affirmative

action legislation enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment.29 8
In addition, in evaluating the constitutionality of federal testing legislation, the Court may rely on its decision in Fulliove v. Klutznick,2 99
the only case in which the Court adjudicated a challenge to federal affirmative action legislation. 3°° Without settling on a standard of re293. See id. at 718-19 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & White, J.); id.
at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that "it is one thing to permit
racially based conduct by the Federal Government-whose legislative powers concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment... and quite another to
permit it by the [states]." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
295. For example, in Part II of her opinion in Croson, Justice O'Connor-joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice White-remarked that just because "Congress may identify and
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, afortiori,the States...
are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate." Id. at 719 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
296. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
297. Id. at 653.
298. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, cited Katzenbach in support of her argument that Congress might be permitted to enact the type of racebased legislation which the Court disallowed in Croson. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). In view of their reliance on Katzenbach, it is possible that these three Justices would endorse rational basis review of congressional affirmative
action legislation.
299. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
300. The reader should note that before this Comment went to press, the Court heard argument in the combined cases of Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg, cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 715, and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, cert.granted, 110 S. Ct. 715, but had not yet
handed down an opinion in those cases. Each of these cases presents a challenge to Federal
Communications Commission minority preference policies.
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view,30 1 the Court in Fullilove upheld the legislation at issue,30 2 and a
majority of the current Justices continue to regard Fulilove as good
law.

30 3

In the process of adjudicating the Fullilove decision, Chief Justice
Burger recognized that Congress was competent both to discover and
address the effects of society-wide discrimination. 3° In Croson, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined in part II of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in which she extensively discussed Chief Justice Burger's rationale for Fulilove's approval of a congressional affirmative action set-aside plan. 30 5 Rather than repudiate Fulilove, Justice O'Connor
relied on that decision in order to distinguish and then disallow the local
plan adopted by the City of Richmond.30 6 In addition, the three dissenting Justices explicitly relied on Fuilove as precedent supporting their
argument that the Richmond plan was constitutional and should be
upheld.30 7
Assuming that, under Fullilove, Congress is empowered to enact legislation in order to remedy the effects of society-wide discrimination, the
proposed testing legislation will be constitutional because it addresses the
effects of discrimination which manifest themselves in an educational
context. To the extent that score differentials result from bias in test
items or test construction, 308 requiring administrators to consider the
race of the test-taker will prevent distortion of the admission decision
into one based on irrational racial classifications rather than on merit. In
addition, the legislation is flexible because it does not require decisionmakers to admit a specified number of minority students but instead
grants them freedom to admit the students of their choice once testing
discrepancies are taken into account.
301. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 472 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Powell & White, JJ.)
(advocating deferential approach in reviewing congressional legislation); id. at 496 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (advocating "compelling governmental interest" standard); id. at 519 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.) (advocating intermediate
scrutiny as appropriate standard of review).
302. Id. at 492 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White & Powell, JJ.); id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.).
303. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 718-20 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 739-45 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
304. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483-84.
305. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 718-20.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 739-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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CONCLUSION

In an 1861 message to Congress, President Lincoln expressed his
commitment to equality of opportunity when he stated that "a leading
object of the government for whose existence we contend [is to] afford all
an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life."' 3 9 In its present
format, standardized testing is compromising this goal. Sociologists and
psychometricians continue to debate the causes of disparities in test results across gender and race groups. However, regardless of the causes,
the legal system may provide a forum for regulating the effects of genderand race-based disparities in test results, either through litigation or
legislation.
The fact that women and minority test-takers generally receive
lower exam scores than their non-minority, male counterparts raises an
inference of discrimination which is actionable in non-educational contexts. However, the problematic effects of higher education testing are
not fully redressable by the current legal system. The complexities involved in litigating testing claims suggests that regulation of test use may
be preferable to litigation. Federal or state legislation may alleviate the
detrimental effects of test use and may prevent testing from exacerbating
existing inequities in the distribution of educational resources in this
country.
Lora Silverman*

309. S. BRINT & J. KARABEL, supra note 25, at 3 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, July 4, 1861).
* I am very grateful to Professor Larry Solum for his time and guidance throughout the
preparation of this Comment. I also wish to thank Keith Stolzenbach for his varied and invaluable contributions in support of my efforts to write and publish this paper,
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STANDARDIZED TESTING

A: SAT AVERAGES AND ENROLLMENT STATISTICS FOR
"MOST COMPETITIVE" COLLEGES

College
Amherst
Brown
Bowdoin
Cal Tech
Carleton
Columbia
Columbia (Eng.)
Cooper Union
Cornell
Dartmouth
Duke
Georgetown
GMI Eng. Mgmt.
Harvard
Johns Hopkins
U. Michigan
Middlebury
MIT
Northwestern
Notre Dame
Princeton
Rice
Stanford
Swarthmore
Union College
Air Force Acad.
Naval Acad.
U. Virginia
Wellesley
Wesleyan
Williams
Yale

SAT-V

SAT-M

642
680
630
670
(SAT not required)
650
760
625
660
628
660
570
710
560
710
595*
680*
620
680
624
682
626
665
535
645
670
700
'620
680
560
640
610
640
635*
735*
590
650
570
640
643
696
630
690
650*
700*
633
667
(ACT required)
579
665
583
664
586
646
610
640
626
665
650
682
660*
695*

%Women
43
47
4616
51
44
33
.31,
45
39
46
51
26
42
35
48

%Black

%Hispanic

(not given)

(not given)

5M
32
49
31
38
39
43
49
40
13
9
50
100
48
44
44

Total average enrollment of women = 41.3%**
Total average minority enrollment = 8.86%
The statistics in the table are reported in ARCO, THE RIGHT COLLEGE 1989 (1988).
* For these colleges, SAT scores were not reported in ARCO. Therefore, the SAT scores
listed were computed from ranges reported in THE COLLEGE BOARD, THE COLLEGE HANDBOOK
(1989-90) (1988).
** The following colleges were eliminated from the calculation of average enrollment of women
students:
Wellesley College (all women's college)
Naval Academy
Air Force Academy
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B: ADMISSION RATES OF MEN AND WOMEN APPLICANTS
AT COMPETITIVE COLLEGES

Source:

THE COLLEGE BOARD, THE COLLEGE HANDBOOK

(1989-90)

(1988)
College
Amherst
Bowdoin
Brown
Cal Tech
Carelton
Columbia
Columbia (Eng.)
Cooper Union
Cornell
Dartmouth
Duke
Georgetown
GMI Eng. Mgmt.
Harvard
Johns Hopkins
U. Michigan
Middlebury
MIT
Northwestern
Notre Dame
Princeton
Rice
Stanford
Swarthmore
Union
U. Virginia
Wesleyan
Williams
Yale

Admit Rate of Men*

Admit Rate of Women*

20
23
21
29
39
25

18
21
21
39
44
27
(not given)
12
28
23
22
21

23
27
18
23
23
(not given)
15
45

16
40
(not given)

27
21
44
35
17
31
15
34
33
27
35
25
19

28
39
42
32
16
32
17
33
51
28
30
24
18

* Admission rate means the percentage of those admitted out of the total that applied
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APPENDIX C:

SAT

AVERAGES AND ENROLLMENT STATISTICS FOR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS AND CALIFORNIA
STATE SCHOOLS

Source:

ARCO, THE RIGHT COLLEGE 1989 (1988)

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Campus
Berkeley
Davis
Irvine
Los Angeles
Riverside
San Diego
Santa Barbara
Santa Cruz

SAT-V

SAT-M

532
490
465
518
497
502
494
521

607
564
569
599
567
586
570
562

%Women
47
52
52
52
51
46
50
51

%Black

%Hispanic

6
3
3
7
5
3
3
2

8
3
7
14
10
9
7
6

Total average enrollment of women = 50.1%
Total average black/hispanic enrollment = 12.0%
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

CALIFORNIA STATE
Campus
Bakersfield
Chico
Dominguez Hills
Fresno
Fullerton
Hayward
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Northridge
Sacramento
San Bernardino
Stanislaus

SAT-V

SAT-M

%Women

%Black

%Hispanic

425
435

469
490

64
49
56
50
52
59
55
55
54
52
23
56

5
2
35
4
2
9
5
12
5
5

12
5
11
16
9
7
9
25
11
6

(not given)
416
414

464
482
(not given)

407

472
(not given)
(not given)

428
450*
411

484
400*
462

(not given)

Total average enrollment of women = 54.7%*
Total average black/hispanic enrollment = 18.72%*
* Enrollment averages exclude California State University at San Bernardino because enrollment
statistics for minority students were not available.
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CALIFORNIA Two-YEAR PUBLIC COMMUNITY

COLLEGES: BLACK

Source:
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&

HISPANIC STUDENT ENROLLMENTS

PETERSON'S Two-YEAR COLLEGES

College
Allan Hancock College
American River College
Antelope Valley College
Bakersfield College
Barstow College
Butte College
Cabrillo College
Canada College
Cerritos College
Cerro Coso Community College
Chabot College
Chaffey Community College
Citrus College
City College of San Francisco
Coastline Community College
College of Alameda
College of the Canyons
College of the Desert
College of Marin: Kentfield
College of San Mateo
College of the Sequoias
College of Siskiyous
Columbia College
Compton Community College
Contra Costa College
Cosumnes River College
Crafton Hills College
Cuesta College
Cuymaca College
Cypress College
De Anza College
Diablo Valley College
East Los Angeles College
El Camino College
Evergreen Valley College
Feather River College
Foothill College
Fresno City College
Fullerton College
Gavilan College
Golden West College
Grossmont Community College
Hartnell College
Imperial Valley College
Irvine Valley College
Kings River Community College
Lake Tahoe Community College
Laney College
Lassen College
Long Beach City College

1989

1990 172-686 (1989)

% Black

% Hispanic

8
N/A
6
5
10
1
1
5
5
N/A
7
7
6
9
1
37
1
4
N/A
3
2
3
N/A
60
23
13
3
1
2
3
3
2
N/A
19
6
1
4
6
2
1
1
3
3
1
1
2
1
39
2
11

12
N/A
8
16
15
5
7
13
20
N/A
9
18
20
11
4
7
5
13
N/A
7
22
2
N/A
27
9
8
10
5
10
8
7
4
N/A
14
18
3
5
21
11
26
7
8
24
63
5
31
4
5
5
20
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Los Angeles City College
Los Angeles Harbor College
Los Angeles Mission College
Los Angeles Pierce College
Los Angeles Southwest College
Los Angeles Trade and Tech.
Los Angeles Valley College
Los Medanos College
Mendocino College
Merced College
Merritt College
Mira Costa College
Mission College
Modesto College
Monterey Penninsula College
Moorpark College
Mount San Antonio College
Mount San Jacinto College
Napa Valley College
Ohlone College
Orange Coast College
Oxnard College
Pacific Coast College
Palo Verde College
Palomar College
Pasadena City College
Porterville College
Rancho Santiago Community College
Rio Hondo College
Riverside Community College
Sacramento City College
Saddleback College
San Bernardino Valley College
San Diego City College
San Diego Mesa College
San Diego Miramar College
San Joaquin Delta College
San Jose City College
Santa Barbara City College
Santa Monica College
Santa Rosa Junior College
Shasta College
Sierra College
Skyline College
Solano Community College
Southwestern College
Taft College
Ventura College
Victor Valley College
Vista College
West Hills College
West Los Angeles College
West Valley College
Yuba College

-

Total average Black/Hispanic enrollment = 23.31%

TESTING
24
14
10
4
72
35
7
8
1
7
34
5
4
1
8
1
7
3
2
4
1
6
N/A
10
2
9
3
3
4
9
12
1
11
19
14
7
5
6
2
11
2
10
N/A
6
12
6
9
2
9
15
5
N/A
2
4

1481
26
15
36
9
23
17
18
11
4
15
6
21
11
12
4
7
25
12
6
10
7
28
N/A
30
10
20
19
15
43
12
12
5
17
15
6
4
15
18
17
11
5
26
N/A
17
8
32
3
15
6
5
21
N/A
7
10
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